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I. INTRODUCTION
In film, every item in a scene is part of the story.1 From actors to set
designs, careful consideration is given to every detail to help convey the desired
message or emotion.2 Production teams pursue a great level of detail, depth, and

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2020; B.A.
Philosophy, California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, 2014. I would like to thank Distinguished
Professor of Law John Sprankling for his guidance as faculty advisor to this Comment. I would also like to
thank the entire Law Review editorial staff for their assistance with this article. Most of all, a special thank you
to my friends and family for their constant support and encouragement.
1. ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., COSTUME DESIGN: DEFINING CHARACTER INSTRUCTIONAL
GUIDE, 6 (2014), available at https://www.oscars.org/sites/oscars/files/teachersguide-costumedesign-2015.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
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realism in film, often requiring the use of copyrighted material to achieve this
goal.3 Obvious background copyrighted materials in film include artwork,
posters, and billboards.4 Less obvious background materials may include the
architectural aspect of buildings, the design of furniture, and even the clothing of
each character.5
Character fashion choices in film promote free expression and allow viewers
to understand the character's culture and individuality.6 Filmmakers pay close
attention to fabrics used in film productions to ensure that their use incites the
desired emotional effect.7 A genuine threat of infringement exists for textile
designers when filmmakers select garments with their fabric designs for use in
films. 8
Textile designers, like artists, spend countless hours creating masterpieces
and are shocked when others steal, use, and profit from their designs without
permission. 9 Textile designers use unique combinations of shapes and colors to
create copyrightable fabric pattern designs. 10 These textile designers face
uncertainty in protecting their creations and often struggle to control the rights
and uses of their designs.11 Filmmakers and television producers may be liable
for copyright infringement for using another artist’s copyrighted design, without
permission, to recreate a derivative version of the original in the background of a

3. See generally John M. Garon, Managing Content in the Frame: Script Clearance, Background
Copyrights
and
Third-Party
Ownership
Rights,
GCG
LAW
4–5
(Feb.
2010),
http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/filmcontent.html(on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (describing how copyrighted works are “being used as background or foreground decoration on a
feature film or television show.”).
4. Id.
5. Adam Freeman, IP Clearance in Motion Pictures, Videos and Other Audio-Visual Works, MEDIUM
(July 31, 2017), https://medium.com/@adamcolefreedman/ip-clearance-in-motion-pictures-videos-and-otheraudio-visual-works-87ab5fc6734b (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
6. ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1.
7. Id. at 6–7.
8. See generally Tyler McCall, Copyright, Trademark, Patent: Your Go-To Primer for Fashion
Intellectual Property Law, FASHIONISTA (Dec. 16, 2016), https://fashionista.com/2016/12/fashion-law-patentcopyright-trademark (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the copyrightability of
fabric).
9. See generally Ona Abelis, Copyrighting Creativity: What Rights Do Artists Really Have?, BROOKLYN
MAG. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bkmag.com/2015/08/27/copyrighting-creativity-what-rights-do-artistsreally-have/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting artist, Regina Elliot, describing
struggles young artists often go through in their inability to obtain proper representation to protect their designs
“[I] couldn’t afford it and was always dependent on who the scheme-y person I was working with and how
creatively they tried to abuse my rights.”).
10. Amanda Schallert, Fashion Lawyers Have Seen Textile Copyright Litigation Increase Over the Past
Five Years, EARLY SULLIVAN (June 10, 2016), https://www.earlysullivan.com/fashion-lawyers-have-seentextile-copyright-litigation-increase-over-the-past-five-years-los-angeles-and-san-francisco-daily-journal
(on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. McCall, supra note 8; see Abelis, supra note 9 (explaining position artists are put in when attempting
to gain recognition: “The galleries, museums, and buyers have the power and the resources to call the shots and
the artists have to quietly sign on the dotted line.”).
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film. 12 Generally, media production teams must obtain clearance from the owner
before using a copyrighted design.13
In recent years, clothing retailers faced increased litigation due to copyright
infringement suits by textile designers.14 Between 2009 and 2015, four textile
designers filed thousands of copyright infringement suits against a handful of
retailers for their use of copyrighted textile patterns. 15 One example is Unicolors,
Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., where a Los Angeles based fabric manufacturer
sued a worldwide retail company operating more than 500 stores. 16
In Unicolors, the retailer, Urban Outfitters, designed and sold a dress made
of fabric similar to one owned by Unicolors.17 Both fabric patterns featured
“nearly identical” details of “crowded arrangements of splayed floral and feather
motifs.”18 The major difference between the two patterns was the color
arrangement—the original Unicolors pattern was red, purple, black, and white,
while the Urban Outfitters design was blue and yellow. 19
Two years prior to Urban Outfitters’ release of their dress design, Unicolors
registered its copyrighted pattern to protect its creation as an investment against
competition.20 Additionally, in the three years surrounding Urban Outfitters’ use
of fabric similar to the one owned by Unicolors, Unicolors sold over 14,000
yards of their original fabric to various customers within the United States. 21
Unicolors sought to prove Urban Outfitters infringed on their design because
absent copying, it would be impossible for the designs to be so similar. 22
Ultimately, the court held that due to the overwhelming similarities in the
patterns and circumstantial inferences of copying the design, Urban Outfitters
was liable for willful infringement of Unicolor’s fabric pattern.23

Generally, the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) protects only
original color arrangements, patterns, and novel combinations of various artistic

12. Abelis, supra note 9.
13. Freeman, supra note 5.
14. Ian P. Murphy, The Rise of Copyright Infringement Lawsuits—and What Retailers Can Do About it,
RETAIL D IVE (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.retaildive.com/news/the-rise-of-copyright-infringementlawsuitsand-what-retailers-can-do-about/404336/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
15. Id.
16. Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017).
17. Id. at 984.
18. Id. at 985–86.
19. Id. at 985.
20. Id. at 984.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 985–86.
23. Id. at 987–88.
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elements.24 The Copyright Act also provides that the “fair use” of any
copyrighted material is not infringement. 25 The Copyright Act further provides
four factors for courts to consider when analyzing whether use is fair. 26 However,
courts have applied the factors inconsistently causing mixed results across
jurisdictions.27
To provide a guide for compliance with copyright law and to protect textile
designers, the Copyright Act should be amended to include an additional factor
inspired by the Second and Ninth Circuit’s fair use analysis of copyrighted
materials.28 By analogizing standards from cases involving fabric patterns and
background art used in film, this Comment will set forth a standard for those in
the entertainment industry to determine what constitutes infringement regarding
fabric patterns used in film. 29
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief explanation of copyright law and
its relation to textile designers. 30 Part III will discuss copyrighting fabric pattern
designs.31 Part IV will describe the Useful Article Doctrine and determine
whether integration of fabric designs into useful articles results in a loss of
copyright protection. 32 Part V will discuss the Fair Use Doctrine’s application to
copyrighted fabric through case analysis. 33 Part VI will then discuss and suggest
a standard that can be implemented to provide a guide for those in the film
industry when using copyrighted materials in productions to potentially avoid
infringement litigation.34

II. COPYRIGHT LAW

The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”35 Copyright law provides definitive protection
24. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Oliver Herzfeld, Protecting
Fashion
Designs,
FORBES
(Jan.
3,
2013,
9:14
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/01/03/protecting-fashion-designs/#1b80a04db317 (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
26. Id. at § 107(1)–(4).
27. NIMIA, Copyright Infringement in Videos, 8, 15, available at https://nimia.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Copyright-Infringement-in-Videos.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); Laurie Tomassian, Transforming the Fair Use Landscape by Defining the Transformative Factor, 90
S. CAL. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (2017).
28. See infra Part VI (suggesting additional factor to be included in Copyright Act).
29. Infra Part IV.
30. Infra Part II.
31. Infra Part III; Section III.A.
32. Infra Part IV.
33. Infra Part V.
34. Infra Part IV.
35. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
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for textile designers for their original prints, patterns, and color arrangements. 36
Intellectual property law, more generally, provides protection for the creation of
intangible property.37 While specific protections are available through patent and
trademark law, copyright law provides the best protection because all original
works are automatically copyrighted upon creation or fixation in a physical
medium. 38
Copyright protection affords creators exclusive rights to reproduce,
publicly display, prepare derivative versions, and distribute copies made of their
own copyrighted works.39 Owning a copyright offers a right to inhibit others
from exploiting copyrighted designs.40 Artists even retain copyright protection
after the sale of items integrating their copyrighted designs within them. 41 This
provides certainty in copyright protection which allows textile designers to
prevent knock-off recreations of their own designs.42
Copyright protection is not available, however, for thoughts or ideas. 43 If
an individual hears of or is told of an idea that is not fixed in a tangible
expression, they are free to use it.44 Additionally, and as related to fabric designs,
one cannot hold a copyright over the idea of a particular pattern or design. 45 This
means that no single textile designer can monopolize the ownership of a
particular shape or color, but can protect their tangible expression that integrates
such shapes or colors into a unique design.46
Registration is not required to own a copyright. 47 Protection is afforded
whether or not designs are ever published or registered. 48 However, copyright
registration is much easier than the formal requirements of patent and trademark
protection: individuals register online, complete an application, provide a copy of

36. Herzfeld, supra note 24.
37. McCall, supra note 8.
38. Abelis, supra note 9.
39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
40. Anne Kearns, Copyright in the Fashion Business? It All Depends . . ., ANNE KEARNS LAW (Feb. 20,
2018),
https://www.annekearnslaw.com/single-post/2018/02/13/Copyrights-in-the-Fashion-Business-It-AllDepends (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. Abelis, supra note 9.
42. David E. Shipley, All for COPYRIGHT Stand Up and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test, U. G A. SCHOOL OF LAW 152 (Univ. Ga. Sch. of
L., Res. Paper No. 2017-25, 2018).
43. Kearns, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. Emily F. Evitt, Copyright Protection of Fabric Designs, MS&K’S FASHION INDUSTRY BLOG (Nov. 5,
2012),
available
at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/281322ca-b4e5-4e14-8d09358df8ea391b.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
46. Id.
47. Kearns, supra note 40.
48. Id.
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the work to be registered, and pay a filing fee. 49
Artists, or copyright holders, automatically receive protection when they
create their designs, but they may face difficulties proving ownership in litigation
because filing a federal suit for infringement requires copyright registration. 50
While not technically required to obtain copyright protection, registration is
necessary for those intending to enforce copyright ownership as registration
provides notice of ownership to others. 51
The Supreme Court recently decided a case resolving the jurisdictional split
as to whether applying for protection alone could satisfy the registration
requirement. 52 The Court held that while certain circumstances may allow for
filing infringement suits prior to registration, copyright owners must eventually
obtain registration over their copyrights to maintain their suits.53
With the exponential growth in the number lawsuits pertaining to textile
infringement, this development by the Supreme Court affects the use of fabric
patterns in film because registration may take months to complete which could
stall production or interfere with film schedules. 54 Regardless, the registration
requirement must be met prior to filing any infringement suit. 55
III. IS FABRIC COPYRIGHTABLE?

Determining what features in the fashion industry are copyrightable can be
confusing.56 A necessary distinction exists between “fabric design” and “dress
design.”57 “Fabric design” refers to patterns printed on fabric. 58 These designs
often include artistic and unique elements, which—like any other artistic
creation—maintain copyright protection. 59 “Dress design” refers to the style, cut,

49. Abelis, supra note 9.
50. Id.
51. See Kearns, supra note 40 (describing marks used to provide notice of copyright rights as “© [year]
by [name of owner]” as well as use of “‘Copyright’ or ‘Copr.’ in place of the ©”).
52. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., 139 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2019).
53. Id. at 888.
54. See Amanda Schallert, Fashion Lawyers Have Seen Textile Copyright Litigation Increase Over the
Past Five Years, EARLY SULLIVAN (June 10, 2016), https://www.earlysullivan.com/fashion-lawyers-have-seentextile-copyright-litigation-increase-over-the-past-five-years-los-angeles-and-san-francisco-daily-journal
(on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the fact that of the 2,500 copyright infringement
cases filed between 2011 and 2015 in the Central District of California, 417 were filed by textile
manufacturers); see generally Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 892 (discussing increased wait times for copyright
registration process).
55. See id. at 888 (2019) (holding “the copyright owner must eventually pursue registration in order to
maintain a suit for infringement.”).
56. Kearns, supra note 40.
57. Carl Mazurek, Fashion Copyright and the Muddle of the Useful Articles Doctrine, N.Y.U. J. INTELL.
PROP . & ENT. L. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2015), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2015/10/fashion-copyright-and-themuddle-of-the-useful-articles-doctrine/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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or shape of clothing.60 Dress design represents the utility and functional aspect of
clothing. 61
The distinction between dress design and fabric design provides a significant
defining line related to the available copyright protections for fashion designers. 62
Recognizing the similarities between uniquely-dyed fabrics and artistic creations
on canvas, the Copyright Office provides textile designers protections for their
fabric designs.63 Textile designers take unique shapes and colors which may not
be eligible for protection alone and arrange them in ways that create novel
combinations of designs.64
The artistic features of fabric designs are copyrightable, so long as they are
separable from their utility or functionality. 65 Only the separable elements of the
fabric prints are copyrightable.66 For example, envision a piece of fabric as a twoply square, then separate the top layer from the bottom. 67 This separation leaves
two identifiable elements: the unique print on the top layer and the actual,
tangible piece of fabric.68 The fabric, which serves an entirely functional purpose,
is not copyrightable, but the artistic and separable element of the fabric pattern
is.69
The jurisdictional inconsistencies between the Second and Ninth Circuits’
analysis of copyright protection over fabric design needs resolution. 70 Courts in
the Second Circuit traditionally focus on the “ordinary observer” test to
determine whether designs are “substantially similar.”71 Ninth Circuit courts use
an extrinsic and intrinsic analysis of the copyrighted designs to determine
whether they are “substantially similar.”72
The Second Circuit decided Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. and analyzed
the use of copyrighted appliques on various clothing items. 73 There, New York
manufacturer, Knitwaves, sued a competing manufacturer, Lollytogs, after
noticing comparable designs on sweaters manufactured by each company. 74 A
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. McCall, supra note 8.
64. Schallert, supra note 54.
65. Intellectual Property Alert: Will Fashion Designers Finally Be Clothed in “Copyright” Protection?,
VORYS (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.vorys.com/publications-656.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
66. McCall, supra note 8.
67. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1004 (2017) (discussing
conceptual separation); see also Shipley, supra note 42 at 157–58 (explaining different separability tests
established by courts in copyright infringement cases).
68. McCall, supra note 8.
69. Id.
70. See Evitt, supra note 45 (discussing jurisdictional inconsistencies).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1995).
74. Id.
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design executive at Lollytogs had brought in a Knitwaves sweater and had
instructed his team to create the “same feel” as those from Knitwaves. 75
Lollytogs created its sweater design using no other inspiration aside from the
original design of the Knitwaves sweater. 76
After showing proof of a valid copyright, a plaintiff alleging copyright
infringement must prove “(1) the defendant has actually copied the plaintiff’s
work; and (2) the copying is illegal because substantial similarity exists between
the defendant’s work and the protectable element of the plaintiff’s.”77 Knitwaves
and Lollytogs agreed the designs were copied, but disagreed as to whether the
designs were substantially similar.78 The court stated the test for determining
whether designs are substantially similar is that of the “ordinary observer,” where
the court analyzes “whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”79
The court, in viewing the totality of the designs, held that “[a]n observer
viewing the sweaters side by side cannot help but perceive them as coming from
one creative source.”80 Despite the minor changes Lollytogs attempted to create
in their new sweater design, such as the number of appliques used and additional
pattern designed, “the differences pale[d] in comparison to the overwhelming
impression of similarity” to the Knitwaves sweater.81 Reasoning the designs were
substantially similar, the court held Lollytogs liable for copyright infringement of
the Knitwaves sweaters.82

The Ninth Circuit, in L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc.,
extended its own “substantially similar” analysis by including extrinsic and
intrinsic tests.83 There, a fabric printing company sued a retailer after noticing
clothing bearing similar designs to copyrighted patterns available for sale in their
stores.84 To prove the defendants copied the design, the court required proof of
plaintiff’s valid copyright, defendant’s access to plaintiff’s design, and
substantial similarity between designs. 85 While failing to make an ultimate
75. Id. at 1000.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1002; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)
(discussing requirements for federal copyright suit as “To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must
prove two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.”).
78. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 1004.
81. Id. at 1004–05.
82. Id. at 1005.
83. L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012).
84. Id. at 845.
85. Id. at 846 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361
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determination on the facts, the court clarified its own “substantially similar”
analysis.86
In determining whether separate designs are “substantially similar” the court
explained that it applies a two-part, extrinsic and intrinsic, test:
The extrinsic test is an objective comparison of specific expressive
elements; it focuses on the articulable similarities between the two
works. The intrinsic test is a subjective comparison that focuses on
whether the ordinary, reasonable audience would find the works
substantially similar in the total concept and feel of the works.87
In its extrinsic test, the court relied on the Knitwaves “ordinary observer test”
to compare the similarity of designs. 88 While the court found many objective
similarities in color arrangement and overall pattern, it ultimately found genuine
disputes regarding material facts of substantial similarity because a jury could
find similarities or differences in design and process. 89 Additionally, in its
intrinsic analysis, the court looked more subjectively at the ordinary observer to
determine if the designs were substantially similar.90
Though the court did not decide on either the extrinsic or intrinsic evaluation
of the substantially similar analysis, the court held the “subjective evaluation of
the expressive similarities in two fabric designs…is best suited for the trier of
fact.”91 L.A. Printex provides a distinction in the substantially similar analysis
where “[t]he extrinsic test considers the objective similarities in two works and
leaves the subjective analysis of such similarities to the intrinsic test.”92

The distinction between dress design and fabric design provides textile
designers with copyright protection over the separable portions of fabric patterns
like other forms of art.93 As fabric is copyrightable, if a textile designer sees their
design used in film without their permission, they may file a copyright
infringement claim. 94 Courts should reconcile the inconsistent application of the
“substantially similar” analysis to provide for uniformity on the federal level. 95

(discussing valid copyright requirement for federal copyright suit).
86. L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 848–852.
87. Id. at 848 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 850–51.
90. Id. at 852.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. McCall, supra note 8.
94. Abelis, supra note 9.
95. Evitt, supra note 45; see infra Part VI (proposing additional factor to fair use analysis).
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IV. IS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION LOST WHEN FABRIC IS INTEGRATED INTO A
USEFUL ARTICLE?

Traditionally, the United States has not recognized fashion as a form of art. 96
Described as “easier stated than applied,” the Useful Article Doctrine
encapsulates a principle at the core of the Copyright Act by refusing to extend
protection to primarily utilitarian or functional designs. 97 The Useful Article
Doctrine causes confusion in the fashion industry because designers can
copyright portions of designs, but a designer cannot copyright the design itself.98
While the Copyright Act clearly does not protect useful articles, the lack of
uniformity in the application of the doctrine creates overwhelming uncertainty
for design manufacturers regarding available protections for their designs. 99 Part
A describes the Useful Article Doctrine’s limitation on copyright protection. 100
Part B examines the impact of a recent Supreme Court case, Star Athletica, LLC.
v. Varsity Brands, Inc., on copyright protection within the fashion industry. 101
A. The Useful Article Doctrine
The Copyright Act defines a useful article as a tangible work “having
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information.” 102 The Copyright Act recognizes the limited
copyrightability of design components that are independent and separable from
their functional or utilitarian aspects. 103 Dress design—like a garment’s shape,
style, or cut—is a useful article as its function is inseparable from any
identifiable artistic element.104 The shape, cut, or style of a garment has the
purely functional value of being worn.105 These functional designs are not
“independent artistic work[s]” that qualify for copyright protection. 106
Copyright law does not protect items which are functional or utilitarian.107 In

96. Mazurek, supra note 57 (explaining the difference between the correlation in European fashion to
“traditional fine arts” as opposed to fashion in the United States which “has been treated as more akin to
products such as lamps or furniture”).
97. Id.; Norman J. Leonard, Applying Copyright Law to Useful Articles – A Dispute Over Cheerleading
Uniforms May Result In A New, Unified Test, WARD & SMITH (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://wardandsmith.com/articles/applying-copyright-law-to-useful-articles (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
98. Kearns, supra note 40.
99. Leonard, supra note 97.
100. Infra Section IV.A.
101. Infra Section IV.B.
102. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (defining “useful article”).
103. Leonard, supra note 97.
104. Kearns, supra note 40.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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1954, the Supreme Court upheld this principle in Mazer v. Stein.108 In Mazer, an
artist created original statuette sculptures of dancers and a manufacturer copied
the design and incorporated it into a lamp base without the artist’s permission. 109
The Copyright Office allowed for protection over the statuette sculptures as
works of art “in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned….”110
The Court further explained that while integrated into a lamp base, the
original sculpture did not lose its copyright protection because there was some
artistic value in the statuette itself. 111 The Court used the separation between the
statuette and the lamp to create a separation test to determine the copyrightability
of an item; however, the Court did not discuss how to apply the test. 112 In
recognizing copyright protection for artistic objects, the Court held protection is
“given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”113
To “codify” Mazer, the Copyright Act further explains the application of the
Useful Article Doctrine as:
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the
extent that such design incorporates pictoral, graphic, or scriptural
features that can be identified separately from and are capable of existing
independently from the article. 114
The added distinction requires a separation from the useful feature of the
design.115 Jurisdictions have struggled to consistently apply the separability
analysis when evaluating copyrightability. 116 Courts previously used a physical
separation requirement when analyzing the separability test, but soon realized the
physical requirement was insufficient to cover all copyright infringement suits. 117
Though designers use fabric to make clothing, the integration does not
destroy copyright protection because designers can satisfy the separability
requirement necessary for copyright protection conceptually, meaning no actual
separation of the design needs to occur.118 The design is protected so long as one

108. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218–19 (1954).
109. Id. at 202–03.
110. Id. at 212.
111. See id. at 214–16 (1954) (discussing copyright protections available for a statuette lamp base).
112. Shipley, supra note 42, at 155–57 (discussing adaptation of the separability test).
113. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
114. Shipley, supra note 42, at 155; see 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29)
(defining “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” as they relate to useful articles).
115. Leonard, supra note 97.
116. Patrick K. McClay, Has Copyright Protection Expanded for Useful Articles?, BAKER BOTTS (Nov.
2017), http://www.bakerbotts.com/insights/publications/2017/11/ip-report-p-mcclay (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
117. Shipley, supra note 42.
118. Intellectual Property Alert, supra note 65; Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
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can perceive a separation between the fabric design and the utility of whatever
garment it is on. 119 Courts began to use adaptations of the separability test to
allow for conceptual separation, but the numerous tests resulted in jurisdictional
inconsistencies when applied. 120
B. Star Athletica, LLC. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided a case that significantly impacted
copyright protections for textile designers and manufacturers. 121 The Court
granted certiorari to resolve the jurisdictional inconsistencies and “widespread
disagreement over the proper test for implementing § 101’s separate
identification and independent-existence requirements.”122 Addressing significant
concerns regarding separability and issues related to functionality and utility of
garments, the decision in Star Athletica provided textile manufactures more
opportunity for protection over “graphical or sculptural” elements of their
designs.123
In Star Athletica, a clothing manufacturer, Varsity Brands, sued a competing
manufacturer, Star Athletica, for alleged infringement of a copyrighted
cheerleading uniform design. 124 The case centered around the consideration of
affording copyright protection for the separable features and industrial designs of
“the particular combination of chevrons, zigzags and stripes that characterizes
Varsity’s uniforms.”125 Ultimately, the Court’s decision allowed copyright
protection for items that are not necessary to the garment’s utility.126
To resolve disagreements between courts related to separability and
functionality in the fashion industry, the Court expanded copyright protection
and determined:
[T]hat a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible
for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two1002, 1013–14 (2017).
119. Intellectual Property Alert, supra note 65; Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1032.
120. Shipley, supra note 42 (discussing the nine different tests applied for conceptual separability and
explaining “[t]he several tests as well as the varied results caused one judge to write that courts ‘have twisted
themselves in knots trying to create a test to effectively ascertain whether the artistic aspects of a useful article
can be identified separately from and exist independently of the article’s utilitarian function.’ Another court
stated that ‘the [conceptual separability] analysis often sounds more like metaphysics than law.’”).
121. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1004–05 (2017); see Shipley, supra note 42 (describing the impact of
Star Athletica).
122. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
123. Mazurek, supra note 57.
124. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
125. Id. at 1008 (2017); Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Court Uses Cheerleader Uniform Case to
Validate Broad Copyright in Industrial Designs, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:31 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-court-uses-cheerleader-uniform-case-validate-broadcopyright-industrial-designs/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
126. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010–12; Mazurek, supra note 57.
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or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2)
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—
either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—
if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is
incorporated.127
The Court created a two-part test for analysis of separability as related to
fabric design and useful articles. 128 Applying their test to the striped decoration
on cheerleading uniforms, the Court noted that Varsity Brands used and applied
their copyrighted stripe design on multiple types of clothing and that in doing so,
replicated the design and not the uniform itself. 129
Additionally, the Court explained that regardless of the stripe design use on
several different uniforms, the design maintained its protection as a “work of
art.”130 Reiterating the distinction between dress design and fabric design, the
Court stated that although Star Athletica gained protection of their design, they
“have no right to prohibit a person from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of
identical shape, cut, and dimension….”131 The Court held that the placement or
integration of a separable copyrighted work into the useful article—the stripes
sewn onto the cheerleading uniform—did not prevent copyright protection. 132
Star Athletica reconciled jurisdictional inconsistencies in the application of
the separability doctrine.133 When designers integrate uniquely crafted textile
designs into clothing, the fabric patterns retain copyright protection because one
can perceive a separation between the fabric design and the tangible fabric.134 In
film, costume designers create clothing for characters using various fabric
patterns.135 Star Athletica created a recognition of copyright protection for textile
designers when films portray their patterns reproduced on useful articles. 136
V. IS THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED FABRIC ON CLOTHING IN FILM FAIR USE?
The Copyright Act provides various limitations on the exclusive use of
copyrighted materials.137 The Copyright Act states “the fair use of a copyrighted
127. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1012.
130. See id. (providing an example of protecting artwork on a guitar and explaining “[i]f that entire
design in imaginatively removed from the guitar’s surface . . . the design if a two-dimensional work of art that
corresponds to the shape of the useful article to which it is applied.”).
131. Id. at 1013.
132. Id. at 1012.
133. McClay, supra note 116.
134. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007–1010 (discussing the test for separation from a useful article).
135. ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1, at 7.
136. See Shipley, supra note 42 (explaining copyright protections afforded to textile designers after Star
Athletica).
137. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use:
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work … is not an infringement of copyright.”138 No infringement occurs when
the use is fair.139 The Copyright Act does not define “fair use,” but lays out four
factors to determine if the use of copyrighted materials is fair.140
Additionally, another defense is available to those using copyrighted
works—“de minimis” use. 141 If the use is so small, insignificant, or de minimis, a
court may allow use without analyzing any fair use factors. 142 Though related to
the substantiality factor, courts do not solely determine de minimis use of
copyrighted works in film by the length of time used.143 Some courts focus on
whether one could observe or recognize the copyrighted work in the film. 144
Filmmakers may claim the use of such textile as incidental and fair resulting
in no infringement liability, but any significant use requires permission from the
owner.145 The Copyright Act recognizes distinct ownership rights between a
copyright and the copyright integrated into an object; thus, clothing made of
copyrighted fabric patterns and used on television without the permission of the
owner may result in copyright infringement liability. 146
Subsection A describes the fair use doctrine and the four factors used to
analyze the doctrine. 147 Subsection B discusses cases where courts analyzed the
use of background art in film, which is analogous to fabric use in film. 148

Fair Use”); 17 U.S.C.A. § 108 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use:
Reproduction by libraries and archives”); 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29)
(“Limitations on exclusive use: Effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord”); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use: Exemption of certain performances and
displays”); 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use:
Secondary transmissions of broadcast programming by cable”).
138. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (providing examples for certain
instances of fair use: “by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research.”).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally Rich Stim, Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STAN. UNIV. LIBR.: COPYRIGHT
& FAIR USE, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing the de minimis exception to using copyrighted work).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Andrew Hudson, Copyright & Artwork in Movies, PHOTOSECRETS (last updated Feb. 4, 2016),
https://www.photosecrets.com/copyright-artwork-movies (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the
work is embodied.”).
147. Infra Section V.A.
148. Infra Section V.B.
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A. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine is the most important defense to avoid liability for
copyright infringement. 149 Through an application of four statutory factors, the
fair use doctrine allows for use of copyrighted material in limited
circumstances.150 The application of such factors often produces inconsistent
results.151 The factors of the fair use doctrine include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 152
The first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” analyzes the
transformative nature of a new design compared to a previously copyrighted
design.153 Courts use the first factor to determine if a new design is original or
merely copied from a previously created design. 154 By taking the time to
determine why someone used the copyrighted material, courts can evaluate if that
use is actually “fair.”155 Merely copying a previously created design can result in
infringement liability, but a transformative or novel use of a portion of a
copyrighted design might justify application of the fair use defense. 156
Additionally, uses for research, education, or scholarship may be fair because
they face commentary and review. 157
The second factor analyzes the characteristics and attributes of the
copyrighted work. 158 In evaluating the nature of the work, the second factor
reinforces the importance of copyright law in the United States because it
prioritizes the control copyright owners have over the use of their design. 159 For
example, use of facts or publicly-beneficial information is fair, whereas use of

149. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Stim, supra note 141; Laurie
Tomassian, Transforming the Fair Use Landscape by Defining the Transformative Factor, 90 S. C AL. L. REV.
1329, 1335 (2017).
150. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Stim, supra note 141.
151. Id.
152. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1)–(4) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
153. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); see also Stim, supra note 141.
154. Id.
155. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) (describing
differences between commercial and nonprofit use of copyrighted materials).
156. Stim, supra note 141.
157. Id.
158. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
159. Id.; Stim, supra note 141.
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another’s fictional work is more difficult to characterize as fair.160 Using
unpublished rather than published materials can result in unfair use because
original owners control the initial appearance of their design or creation. 161
Inappropriate use destroys a copyright owner’s creative control over their design,
which often results in a finding of unfair use. 162
The third factor focuses on the amount and substantiality of portions used
from a copyrighted work. 163 Simply put, “[t]he less you take, the more likely that
your copying will be excused as a fair use.”164 Although, if someone copies a
substantial or essential portion of a copyrighted work, that use is not “fair.” 165
However, substantive use of copyrighted material in a parody is less problematic
because the creators of the parody need the essential portions to create their own
original work. 166
The fourth factor focuses on the economic effect the use of the copyrighted
material has on the market. 167 If the use deprives a copyright owner of potential
profits or future economic opportunities, the use is likely unfair. 168 Regardless of
any competition with the original copyright owner, depriving the owner of profits
will likely result in litigation.169 Even the adapted use of copyrighted works as
inspiration can result in infringement liability because the creation of a different
market results in lost profits to the original owner. 170 Additionally, courts treat
lost profits or economic impact from parodies differently than mere
appropriation, with some courts even allowing use when the parody completely
destroys the market or value for the original. 171
Although applying each of the four factors seems simple, courts struggle to
apply the factors uniformly.172 Courts seem to apply each factor differently or
consider particular factors more significantly than others.173 Additionally, the fair
160. See id. (discussing the application of the “nature of the copyrighted work” factor).
161. Id.
162. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (holding that
publishing the content of a copyrighted manuscript without permission from the owner prior to publication “so
clearly infringes the copyright holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control [that it] is difficult to
characterize it as ‘fair’.”).
163. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
164. Stim, supra note 141.
165. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–65 (explaining that although only 13% of the entire
copyrighted work was copied in the infringing book, the court held the portion taken was “essentially the heart
of the book.”).
166. Stim, supra note 141.
167. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Stim, supra note 141.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding the creation and sale of
sculptures inspired by a copyrighted photograph infringed on an opportunity for the photographer to profit from
the sculpture market of his own original design).
171. Stim, supra note 141.
172. Id.
173. N IMIA, supra note 27, at 7.
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use factors provide a general basis for analyzing the use of copyrighted materials,
but courts also consider additional factors in their analysis. 174 Alternate
considerations include time used, context, and size of the copyrighted material. 175
The fair use analysis becomes complicated because “each case must be
decided on its own facts and tailored to the issues at hand.” 176 Copyright law is
meant to discourage unlawful use or copying of another’s work, but lawmakers
can amend the law to resolve disagreements in the fair use factor analysis. 177
B. Background Art in Film
Film scene complexities require the use of various background items to
provide greater visual detail and realism. 178 Similarly to background art, films use
clothing to help portray certain qualities, tendencies, or emotions of characters. 179
Whether in the foreground or background of a scene, filmmakers cannot use
copyrighted materials without obtaining the express permission from the
copyright owner, unless the use is fair.180 While the fair use factors provide some
guidance in analyzing copyright infringement, applying each factor—especially
in cases involving the use of copyrighted items in a film’s background—causes
confusion and complexity within different jurisdictions. 181

In Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., the Second Circuit considered an
additional factor in the fair use analysis called “observability.” 182 In Ringgold, an
artist brought a copyright infringement suit against a television station, Black
Entertainment Television (“BET”), for their use of a poster version of her
copyrighted design on a television show. 183 Faith Ringgold, an artist, created a
quilted silk-screened print piece entitled “Church Picnic Story Quilt.”184 The
High Museum of Art in Atlanta, Georgia actually owned the quilt and Ringgold
granted exclusive rights for reproduction of the poster versions for sale in the
museum. 185

174. Id. at 6.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See NIMIA, supra note 27, at 17 (describing stock agencies use of copyrighted materials in film).
178. See generally Garon, supra note 3 (describing how copyrighted works are “being used as
background or foreground decoration on a feature film or television show.”).
179. ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1, at 4–7.
180. Garon, supra note 3.
181. N IMIA, supra note 27, at 15.
182. Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997).
183. Id. at 72–73.
184. Id. at 72.
185. Id.
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Without Ringgold’s permission, BET displayed the poster version of the quilt
as part of the set decoration in several television episodes of a show they
produced. 186 The parties agreed that the total use in “[t]he nine sequences in
which a portion of the poster is visible range in duration from 1.86 to 4.16
seconds. The aggregate duration of all nine sequences is 26.75 seconds.” 187 The
court drew a distinction within the concept of de minimis use and explained that
the parties agreed that the feature time of the poster was 26.75 seconds, but that
the parties disagreed as to the “observability” of the copyrighted work. 188
The court reasoned that copyrighted material are used in the background to
increase decorative value but are “filmed at such a distance and so out of focus
that a typical program viewer would not discern any decorative effect that the
work of art contributes to the set.”189 In those instances of small or insignificant
use, use of the copyrighted materials is potentially de minimis and may not
infringe on a copyright owner’s rights.190 However, the court held that “the
painting component of the poster is recognizable as a painting, and with
sufficient observable detail for the ‘average lay observer,’ to discern African–
Americans in Ringgold’s colorful, virtually two-dimensional style.”191 The court
pointed out the lower court’s misapplication of the four fair use factor
examination, and held the use was unfair after applying the observability test
related to an “average lay observer.”192

In Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, the court reinforced the use of its
observability and de minimis analysis in Ringgold.193 Photographer Jorge
Antonio Sandoval sued film production company, New Line Cinema, after ten of
his photographs appeared in a film. 194 In the scene, ten obscure self-portraits of
Sandoval appear affixed to a light box.195 The film features photos in eleven
different shots, none of which appear in focus, for a total of 35.6 seconds. 196
The court stated that “to establish that the infringement of a copyright is de
minimis, and therefore not actionable, the alleged infringer must demonstrate that
the copying of the protected material is so trivial ‘as to fall below the quantitative
threshold of substantial similarity, which is always a required element of
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
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actionable copying.’”197 The court noted that it applies this concept on a case-bycase basis, and that no “bright-line” rules exist related to what is potentially
“substantially similar.”198 Due to the copyrighted materials’ lack of clearly
recognizable features, the court reasoned the photographs’ use fell below the
substantially similar threshold requirement. 199 Reasoning that the “average lay
observer” would have difficulty identifying the photographs as Sandoval’s, the
court held the use was de minimis.200
With the complexities of film and the use of clothing to convey particular
qualities of characters in film, filmmakers and television producers may be liable
for copyright infringement for using another’s copyrighted textile design in their
productions without permission if a viewer recognized it.201 Because textile
designers create their own unique designs affording them copyright protection,
any reproduced use of their designs in film without permission results in
copyright infringement unless the use is fair or de minimis. 202
VI. ESTABLISHING A STANDARD
The Copyright Act protects “…original works of authorship fixed in a
tangible medium of expression.”203 Additionally, the Copyright Act protects only
those elements of an expression that are independent and separable from their
functional or utilitarian features.204 The Copyright Act also prevents any
unauthorized use of copyrighted items unless that use is determined fair. 205
Courts have had mixed results applying the fair use analysis to copyright
infringement cases, especially as they relate to materials in film backgrounds. 206
Some courts have even created their own factors to analyze these cases, which
resulted in uneven application of the fair use defense in copyright infringement
cases.207
197. Id. at 217.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 218.
200. Id.
201. ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1, at 6; Abelis, supra note 9.
202. N IMIA, supra note 27, at 15; Garon, supra note 3.
203. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).
204. Leonard, supra note 97; see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002,
1007 (2017) (developing the current separability standard: “[A] feature incorporated into the design of a useful
article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional
work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined
separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated.”).
205. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (providing limitations of
exclusive use of copyrighted materials or works).
206. N IMIA, supra note 27, at 15.
207. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (using the ordinary
observer test for analyzing substantial similarity); see also L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676
F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (utilizing the extrinsic and intrinsic tests for determining substantial similarity).
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In textile design suits, the Second Circuit uses a standard to analyze
copyright infringement that asks whether the designs are substantially similar. 208
When analyzing the similarities, the court considers “whether ‘an average lay
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work.’”209 The Ninth Circuit also analyzes textile design copyright
infringement cases using the substantial similarity standard, but the court
separates its analysis into an extrinsic and intrinsic test. 210 The extrinsic test
focuses on an “objective comparison” of the designs used, while the intrinsic test
integrates a more subjective approach to determine whether the designs were
substantially similar.211
Regarding background materials in film, courts also use the “substantially
similar” and “average lay observer” tests to evaluate copyright infringement
claims.212 However, the Second Circuit court expanded the substantially similar
analysis by considering whether the copyrighted materials in the background are
“clearly visible” or identifiable to an ordinary observer.213 The court pointed out
that the application of their “substantially similar” analysis still requires a caseby-case determination.214
To provide better guidance for film production teams for use of textile
designer’s copyrighted prints in film, Congress should amend the Copyright Act
to create a fair use factor specifically related to textile designs and film. 215 The
new provision uses Second and Ninth Circuit case law to create an additional
factor in in the fair use defense for analyzing textile design infringement suits as
well as the use of background art in film. 216
To reconcile jurisdictional inconsistencies in applying the fair use factor
analysis to copyright infringement claims, the Copyright Act should be amended
as follows:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

208. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002.
209. Id.
210. L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 848.
211. Id.
212. Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1997); Sandoval v. New Line
Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998).
213. Id. at 218.
214. Id. at 217.
215. See supra Part VI.
216. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002–05 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing textile
design infringement); see also L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir.
2012) (discussing textile design infringement); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 71–72 (discussing fair use analysis in
background art); Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217–18 (discussing fair use analysis in background art).
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole;
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work; and
(5) as related to the use of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in
audiovisual works, the observability and recognition of substantially
similar use, determined through an objective comparison of each design
from the viewpoint of an ordinary observer.217
Two particular states within the Second and Ninth Circuits, California and
New York, dominate the fashion and film industries. 218 Consequently, the Second
and Ninth Circuits have tailored analyses to address common issues in fashion
and film within their jurisdictions. 219 Whether textile designers retain protection
over their copyrighted fabric patterns that appear in film, like copyrighted works
in stock video backgrounds, has “no direct case precedent.” 220
Creating a fair use factor tailored to audiovisual works would avoid the
confusion of a complex fair use analysis by providing clarity in evaluating the
use of fabric patterns in film. 221 Additionally, reaffirming protections will provide
certainty in ownership and abilities to pursue legal action for textile designers in
the event films use their pattern designs without permission. 222
The inclusion of an additional factor does not, however, resolve the

217. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (emphasis added to show
change made implementing case law analysis from dominating fashion and film industries in the Second and
Ninth Circuits); Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002; L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 848; Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217–18.
218. Steve Vondran, California Fashion Infringement Lawyer – Copyrighted Prints, Florals, Designs,
Animal Skins at Issue, VONDRAN LEGAL (Aug. 18, 2017), http://vondranlegal.com/california-fashioninfringement-lawyer-copyrighted-prints-florals-designs-animal-skins-at-issue (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); see generally Katie Kilkenny, L.A. Outpacing New York in Film and Digital Media
Employment, Study Finds, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:45 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/la-outpacing-new-york-film-digital-media-employment-study-finds1143546 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the increase in employment in the
entertainment industry in California in comparison to New York); Emily Buder, California Ranks 1st for Most
Film Productions, New York Falls to 6th, NO FILM SCHOOL (June 16, 2016),
https://nofilmschool.com/2016/06/california-ranks-1st-most-film-productions-new-york-6th (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
219. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002 (using the ordinary observer test for analyzing substantial
similarity); see also L.A. Printex., 676 F.3d at 841 (utilizing the extrinsic and intrinsic tests for determining
substantial similarity).
220. See generally NIMIA, supra note 27, at 15 (discussing the lack of case precedent regarding
copyrighted works used in video backgrounds).
221. Id. at 17.
222. See generally Abelis, supra note 9 (describing the rights of copyright owners when viewing their
designs used in film without their permission).
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unreliability of application of the fair use defense. 223 The fair use analysis can be
impractical because of the open-endedness of its fact-based evaluation. 224 While
the application would still require case-by-case analysis, the structure of the
analysis would focus on observability, thus integrating considerations from
Second and Ninth Circuit case law to narrow a court’s focus. 225
VII. CONCLUSION
Textile designers may pursue infringement action when film production
companies select clothing, made from fabric containing their designs, for use in
film. 226 With the increase of copyright infringement suits by textile designers, the
need for recognized copyright protection in film is apparent. 227 To use,
reproduce, or recreate fabric patterns in film, filmmakers must obtain permission
from the owner before using the expression unless the use is “fair.”228
However, various circuit courts have failed to apply the fair use defense
uniformly. 229 From the current protections, “the only advice an attorney can give
a client regarding copyrighted work in the background of his video is to either (i)
get permission and pay licensing fees to the copyright owner, or (ii) avoid using
the work altogether.”230 Many in the film industry have decided use of
copyrighted materials without permission is not worth the increased risk of
litigation given the complexities of applying the de minimis analysis and the
uneven, individual application of the fair use defense. 231
Though complications regarding the use of copyrighted works in film will
persist, adding a fifth factor of the fair use defense could resolve inconsistencies
in the various circuit court’s analysis techniques. 232 Creating an additional fair
use factor inspired by analyses in the dominating film and fashion jurisdictions
can resolve many misapplication issues by prioritizing the considerations of
federal courts when analyzing copyright infringement cases. 233

223. Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, UNIVERSITY AM. U. SCH. COMM.S CTR. FOR
SOC.
MEDIA
(2013),
available
at
http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/documents/pages/fairuse_motionpictures.pdf/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
224. Id.
225. Id.; Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); L.A. Printex
Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2012); Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc.,
126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1997); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998).
226. See generally McCall, supra note 8 (describing the ability to copyright fabric).
227. Murphy, supra note 14.
228. Freeman, supra note 5; supra Part VI.
229. See NIMIA, supra note 27, at 15 (describing stock agencies use of copyrighted materials in film).
230. Id. at 18.
231. See id. at 15 (describing stock agencies use of copyrighted materials in film).
232. See Evitt, supra note 45 (discussing inconsistencies between the Second and Ninth Circuits).
233. Id.; Vondran, supra note 218; Kilkenny, supra note 218.
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